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Abstract: Developing countries often have ambitions to become major players 
in the commercial aerospace industry, but it remains effectively a duopoly 
dominated by Boeing of the USA and Europe’s Airbus. China is no exception 
and the projects designed to bring this about have taken a number of forms. 
Adopting the sectoral system of innovation (SSI) as an analytical framework, 
this paper explores recent changes in the industry. Using China’s ARJ21 
regional jet programme as a case study, it examines how these changes provide 
opportunities for latecomer nations to catch-up technologically. It is argued that 
the new institutional context and the presence of new actors within the SSI, 
represent an opportunity for latecomer nations like China to acquire the 
capability to design, develop and manufacture commercial jet airliners, through 
linking with Western suppliers. However the analysis reveals that as a 
latecomer nation, China may prove to be a special case, with the opportunities 
for catch-up by other latecomers much more limited. 
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1 Introduction 
Despite the dominance of the Americans (Newhouse, 2007) and latterly the Europeans, 
several Asian countries have long aspired to catch-up and join the ‘big boys’ in 
commercial aerospace production. The strength of these ambitions is well illustrated by 
Samuels (1994, p.210) who notes how the position of the Japanese is expressed by the 
view that, ‘a nation without an aircraft industry will never pass as an industrial nation of 
the first rank’. However the Asian aerospace industry is, ‘an elephants’ graveyard’ 
(Bitzinger, 2010), littered with the bones of commercial aircraft projects that carried these 
aspirations but failed to deliver. 
Among the most ambitious Asian nations was Indonesia, whose state-owned Industri 
Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN) led by Research and Technology Minister, B.J. 
Habibie, poured millions of dollars in the 1990s into the development of an advanced 
turboprop airliner the N-250 and the N-2130 a 100 seat regional jet. Both fell victim to 
the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. South Korea’s attempts at catch-up were also 
stillborn. The AE-100 Air Express, another 100 seat regional jet project, was a 
collaborative project involving Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and Korean Air (Steenhuis  
et al., 2007) together with other Asian partners, but it too foundered in the mid-1990s, 
mainly because of disagreement on the location of the final assembly line (Lewis, 1995a, 
1996). Even Japan has so far failed despite repeated attempts. In the 1970s a consortium 
comprising Mitsubishi, Kawasaki and Fuji, developed the YS-11, a 60 seat turboprop 
airliner. But though technically sound, it was not a commercial success. A succession of 
projected jet airliner projects followed, including the 200 seat YX jet, the smaller 150 
seat YXX jet and later stills the even more modest YSX-100 60 seat regional jet. 
However none got beyond the drawing board. More recently Mitsubishi has launched a 
new regional jet, the MRJ-70, which is in the early stages of development. 
Finally China has over the last 30 years made several attempts at catch-up in order to 
develop a modern commercial airliner. The most recent of these is the current ARJ21 
project to develop a 100 seat regional jet. Now nearing final certification, this paper uses 
the ARJ21 programme as a case study in order to analyse China’s catch-up attempts. The 
case itself is derived from archival materials, specifically documentary sources in the 
form of specialist aviation periodicals, including Flight International, Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, American Aerospace, Air Transport World and the Aeronautical 
Journal, supplemented by specialist reports into the aerospace industry provided by the 
Financial Times, the RAND Corporation and the US International Trade Commission, 
together with additional quantitative data from Boeing’s Market Forecasts. The case 
advances the proposition that fundamental changes in the sectoral system of innovation 
(SSI) for commercial aerospace, have for the first time raised the prospect that China as a 
latecomer nation may be about to succeed in its ambition to catch-up and become a 
player in the commercial airliner market. 
2 Theoretical framework: SSI 
The systems of innovation approach operates on a number of levels. Where SSI are 
concerned the focus is on a particular technological field or product area (Edquist, 2001). 
An SSI is typically defined as a group of firms active in developing and making a sector’s 
products and in generating and using a sector’s technologies (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; 
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Geels, 2004). As such SSI focus on a range of factors that contribute both directly and 
indirectly to the production of innovations within a particular sector (Hekkert et al., 
2007). The concept of an SSI came about as a result of dissatisfaction with earlier 
theoretical approaches such as those used in industrial economics that focused more 
narrowly on things like R&D intensity and patent activity (Malerba, 2005). Such 
perspectives it is argued are too simplistic and fail to take account of the range of factors 
that are relevant when it comes to explaining differences in innovation across sectors. 
The SSI perspective in contrast, recognises that innovation is likely to be organised and 
carried out very differently across industry sectors, even if they share the same level of 
advanced technology. 
According to Malerba (2004) SSI comprise three main building blocks: the 
knowledge/technology base; actors and their networks; and institutions, all of which 
interact in the development of new products and innovations. Of the three, 
knowledge/technology plays a central role, as it is the knowledge/technology base that 
differentiates and de-limits particular sectors (Edquist, 2001). The nature of the 
knowledge/technology base is also likely to be highly influential in terms of both the 
nature and organisation of innovation. Sources of knowledge too are likely to differ by 
sector (Malerba, 2006). Thus in some sectors scientific advances and breakthroughs will 
be a key input to innovation, while in others advances in R&D may be critical and in yet 
other sectors it may be users who are the main source of knowledge (Malerba and Mani, 
2009). Similarly the scope of the knowledge base can be influential. If advanced 
integration capabilities are important the sector may be concentrated into a few large 
firms, while if knowledge is easily accessible innovation may be undertaken by small 
firms. 
The actors are firms who may be individuals, groups and organisations. They 
comprise not only innovators themselves but suppliers, customers and competitors, as 
well as bodies such as universities, venture capitalists and innovation policy agencies 
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997). It is the actors who initiate and carry out the activities 
associated with the development of new products (Edquist, 2001). Since actors do not 
generally undertake innovation in isolation (Edquist, 2001), the development of new 
products typically involves intense interaction between actors and the knowledge base, 
and it is through this interaction that learning, a vital part of innovation, occurs (Zhang  
et al., 2006). 
In all sectoral systems, institutions play a major role in terms of the organisation of 
innovative activity (Malerba, 2006). Some institutions are national or even international 
while others are purely sectoral. A key feature of institutions of whatever type is the way 
in which, either directly or indirectly, they provide the ‘incentive’ framework, or to use 
North’s (1990, p.3) terminology ‘the rules of the game’, that act as a driver to individuals, 
groups and organisations to initiate and undertake innovation. Such rules take the form of 
sets of routines, established practices, rules and regulations that serve to regulate the 
relations and interactions between the actors in the SSI. In this way they shape the actions 
of the actors in an SSI and relations between them. 
Malerba (2005, p.381) reminds us that there is ‘a rich and heterogeneous tradition’ of 
studies of SSI which clearly show not only that the knowledge/technology base,  
the actors involved in innovation and the links between them and the relevant 
institutional context, are crucial factors when it comes to understanding and explaining 
the process of innovation, but also that these factors differ significantly from sector to  
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sector. Hence sectors may be highly innovative and technologically advanced with strong 
links to science, but the process of innovation may be organised very differently within 
them. 
This helps to explain why, where latecomer nations are concerned, though the 
technological catch-up process may be relatively straightforward in some sectors, it can 
be highly problematic in others, making it almost impossible for new entrants to gain a 
foothold within a sector. Thus in sectors like electronics and automotive products for 
example, entry into the sector has proved feasible for latecomer nations like Brazil, South 
Korea and Malaysia, largely because the innovation process is well understood and the 
SSI does not present hurdles that are impossible to surmount. In other sectors however it 
is a different story, here the nature of the SSI can at times make it very difficult, even for 
ambitious and well resourced latecomer nations, to catch-up and successfully break into 
the sector. 
Sectoral systems are not static, they can and do change and transform over time.  
In theoretical terms the SSI concept is grounded in evolutionary theory. Single  
elements such as actors do not merely evolve in isolation (Lewin and Volderba, 1999). 
Rather as Malerba and Mani (2009) point out they co-evolve with other elements,  
in this instance the knowledge/technology base and the institutional context, as part of a 
process of co-evolution. Hence co-evolutionary effects result in changes in one  
element of the SSI interacting with changes in other elements to induce further  
changes. Changes in the knowledge/technology base for instance can induce major 
changes in the structure and behaviour of actors (i.e., firms). With co-evolution,  
change does not only come about through direct interaction. As Lewin and Volderba 
(1999) note, change can also be recursive, being driven by feedback from the rest of the 
system. 
The effect of changes resulting from co-evolution is to alter the characteristics of the 
SSI, leading to a situation where the innovation process is organised differently.  
Many sectors have seen such changes. Malerba (2005) notes that the computer sector has 
been subject to co-evolutionary processes, leading to a move away from a highly 
concentrated structure where large vertically integrated firms played a dominant role in 
the innovation process, in favour of a structure where interdependencies and externalities 
are important. 
It is against this background that this study focuses on an industry sector which with 
one or two exceptions (Marques and de Oliveira, 2009) has been almost entirely 
neglected by researchers of SSI (McGuire, 1999). And yet, as several observers have 
noted the aerospace sector has been subject in recent years to a number of very 
significant changes in its SSI (Lorrell et al., 2000). In the light of this, this study utilises 
the concept of SSI as a theoretical framework, in order to answer two principal research 
questions: 
1 What have been the main changes in this sector’s SSI? 
2 What are the implications of these changes for latecomer nations seeking to  
catch-up? 
It does this by utilising the development of China’s ARJ21 regional jet programme as a 
case study. 
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3 The evolution of the SSI for commercial aerospace 
3.1 The integrated SSI 
Until the 1990s the SSI for commercial aerospace was very like the innovation system 
that prevailed in the computer industry in the 1960s and 1970s, which was dominated by 
vertically integrated companies such as IBM that produced complete computer systems. 
In terms of innovation and new product development these vertically integrated computer 
companies with their extensive research and development facilities undertook the design, 
development, manufacturing, marketing and distribution of complete mainframe 
computer systems utilising components they produced (Malerba, 2005). 
Since it was also a relatively new high tech industry, the system of innovation in the 
commercial aerospace industry closely resembled the SSI of the early computer industry 
at this time. Key features of the aerospace SSI were large vertically integrated firms who 
formed the principal actors, powerful regulatory institutions that controlled the market 
and a narrowly defined technology base. The actors were large airframe manufacturers 
like Boeing and Lockheed (Lawrence and Thornton, 2005; Newhouse, 2007; Nolan et al., 
2008), that possessed an extensive range of capabilities that enabled them to design, 
develop and manufacture most of the principal systems of a commercial airliner. The 
institutions included a range of regulatory bodies such as the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB) which controlled most aspects of the world’s largest aircraft market 
(Heppenheimer, 1995), the US, IATA the international airline cartel that fixed airline 
fares worldwide and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which had oversight of 
safety standards in the US where most aircraft were built. National governments too were 
important institutions since many airlines were state owned and heavily subsidised 
(Lorrell et al., 2000). The technology base was narrowly drawn being confined to 
mechanical technologies associated with aerodynamics, aero-structures and hydraulics. 
Significantly military and commercial technologies were largely interchangeable 
providing scope for extensive cross subsidisation (Lawrence and Thornton, 2005;  
Rogers, 1996). 
These elements taken together comprised an SSI that emphasised technical excellence 
rather than competitive forces such as costs. Innovation and new product development 
were carried out on an integrated basis by vertically integrated airframe manufacturers 
with the capability to develop and produce the full range of aircraft systems, apart from 
engines. The world’s best-selling airliner of the period for instance, Boeing’s 727 tri-jet, 
had just 2% foreign content (Macpherson and Pritchard, 2007). 
3.2 Co-evolution and the network SSI 
Although this integrated system of innovation prevailed for several decades, since the 
1980s co-evolution of the various elements that make up the system has brought 
significant change and transformation to the innovation and new product development 
process for commercial aerospace. 
3.2.1 Actors 
In the last 30 years new actors have appeared in the aerospace SSI, in particular a group 
of highly capable global suppliers, has emerged alongside the airframe manufacturers as 
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important contributors to the aerospace innovation process. A key factor in their 
expanding role has been the increasingly modular nature of modern airliners reflecting a 
trend seen in other sectors such as the automotive industry. Faced with the problem of 
trying to span an ever greater range of technologies in developing modern airliners, 
airframe manufacturers have relinquished responsibility for the development and 
manufacture of many of the larger modules and sub-systems such as wings, fuselage 
barrels, landing gear and avionics (Cooke and Ehret, 2009; Ehret and Cooke, 2010). 
Instead these modules are increasingly designed, developed and manufactured by 
specialist suppliers who not only undertake manufacturing but extensive research and 
development (McGuire et al., 2010; Smith and Tranfield, 2005). These specialist 
suppliers are much more than mere subcontractors called upon to manufacture 
components on a ‘build-to-print’ basis (Smith and Tranfield, 2005). They have a 
significant level of capability especially with regard to research and development. Many 
are substantial multinational corporations in their own right (Bédier et al., 2008; McGuire 
et al., 2010) and these days they make an important contribution to all new commercial 
airliner development programmes. 
3.2.2 Technology base 
The technology base evolved as new technologies have been embraced by aerospace 
engineers. As a result commercial aerospace evolved from a narrow technology base 
involving a limited range of technologies to a multi-technology industry (Benzler and 
Wink, 2010; McGuire et al., 2010). One of the biggest changes was the application of 
digital electronics which gave rise to fly-by-wire (FBW) technology which transformed 
the control systems of a modern airliner (Langeweische, 2009). Thus digital electronics 
and software became major technologies in aerospace. More recently composite materials 
have become much more widely used even for relatively large aero-structures such as 
wings and fuselage sections. At the same time military and civil aerospace technologies, 
which were once almost identical, have diverged to the point where there is now rarely 
scope for cross-subsidising the development of new civil airliner projects through the use 
of military designed technologies (McGuire et al., 2010). Hence large commercial aircraft 
now utilise a multiplicity of advanced technologies (Nolan et al., 2008), beyond the scope 
of a single firm. 
3.2.3 Institutional framework 
The institutional framework of commercial aerospace has also evolved. Since the 1980s 
de-regulation has swept through the airline industry. In the USA, the CAB was abolished 
opening the world’s largest market to new entrants. It was followed by similar  
de-regulation across Europe and Asia. At the same time the ending of IATA’s role in 
price fixing brought the demise of many well known airline names, and more 
significantly a shift from service competition to intense price competition. Fuelled further 
by privatisation and a decline in state subsidies, the airlines became much more price 
sensitive and pre-occupied with costs (Lorrell et al., 2000; Sampson, 1984). Alongside 
these institutional changes which have affected the macro-environment of the  
industry have come micro level changes affecting firms. These have centred on  
inter-organisational arrangements in the form of partnerships between airframe 
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manufacturers and their suppliers to create global production networks (Dicken, 2011). 
These enable suppliers to take a more active part in new product development. 
3.3 Co-evolution 
Not only have the changes in each of the three elements: actors, technology base and 
institutional framework, had an impact in themselves, they have affected the other 
elements through a process of co-evolution. Thus institutional changes like the abolition 
of the CAB and the reduction in the power of IATA have resulted in much more 
competitive conditions, which have in turn led airframe manufacturers to outsource many 
of their functions, a trend that has also been stimulated by increased modularity and the 
number of technologies used in modern aircraft. The move to a multi-technology 
environment encouraged the growth of global suppliers specialising in particular aircraft 
modules and sub-systems, which in turn led to the increased use of risk and revenue 
sharing partnerships. Added together the combined effect of these changes has been to 
move to a network SSI, where new product development no longer takes place on an 
integrated basis involving a single firm, but is rather the product of a partnership between 
several firms. 
Under this new system, airframe manufacturers like Boeing, act as the lead or 
flagship firm, serving as systems integrator, assembling modules and sub-systems built 
by suppliers working not as subcontractors but as partners (Dunne, 1999). As systems 
integrators they have overall responsibility for design, assembly and marketing the 
complete aircraft. This has allowed the airframe manufacturers to accelerate the 
innovation process, thereby reducing lead times, spreading risk and sharing development 
costs while also learning from suppliers (Nolan and Zhang, 2003). 
In many respects Airbus ushered in the network SSI by pioneering aircraft 
manufacture based on the final assembly of large sub-systems designed, developed and 
manufactured by partners in the European consortium (Cooke and Ehret, 2009; Nolan  
et al., 2008). However in the 1990s Boeing too moved towards a network approach for 
developing new aircraft, when it granted three Japanese firms a 21% stake in the 
development of its new Boeing 777 airliner [Kimura, (2007), p.150; Sabbagh, (1996), 
p.67], a move that brought Japanese firms to the heart of the innovation process as 
members of Boeing’s design team. Nor was this confined to developed countries. In 
Brazil the aerospace firm Embraer (Pritchard and MacPherson, 2007) was one of the first 
to take advantage of opportunities created by the emergence of the new network SSI. In 
the mid-1990s Embraer, took the bold step to develop a 50 seat regional jet using a risk 
and revenue sharing partnership comprising a network of foreign suppliers (Figuieredo  
et al., 2008; Goldstein, 2002). A derivative (Smith and Rogers, 2004) of its existing 30 
seat turboprop design with which it retained 30% commonality [Goldstein and Le Blanc, 
(2003), p.10] the production network involved wings built in Spain, landing gear in 
Germany, rear fuselage in Belgium and engines in the USA, with foreign firms 
contributed some 55% of the value of each aircraft [Goldstein and LeBlanc, (2003), 
p.13]. Utilising a network approach to new product development in this way was a key 
factor in the success of the ERJ-145, 1000 of which were sold in the ten years to 2007 
[Goldstein, (2008), p.58; Marques and de Oliveira, (2009), p.169], as Embrear’s turnover 
increased from US$0.29 billion in 1996 to US$4.6 billion in 2005 [Marques and  
de Oliveira, (2009), p.173)]. 
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Thus as the examples of Boeing and Embraer make clear, by the decade of the 2000s, 
in the commercial aerospace sector the innovation process, by which new products are 
developed, had been transformed as aerospace firms moved from an integrated SSI to a 
network SSI. This came about not merely because the technology evolved over time but 
through a complex process of co-evolution that embraced changes in the technology base, 
the actors and the institutional framework. While new airliner programmes are today 
launched by a single prime contractor like Boeing, who oversees the overall design, 
assembly and marketing of the aircraft, they rely on a network of specialist suppliers for 
the design, development and manufacture of major modules and sub-systems. Hence the 
innovation process in the commercial aerospace sector is now best described as a network 
SSI. 
4 Case study: the ARJ21 regional jet programme 
4.1 Earlier attempts at catch-up 
The origins of China’s aerospace industry lie in the Sino-Soviet pact signed during the 
Korean War in 1953, under the terms of which, Soviet military aircraft were built under 
licence in Shenyang and Harbin in North East China in factories constructed during the 
Japanese occupation of the 1930s (Heymann, 1975). The limitations of this became 
apparent with the break-up of the pact in August 1960 and the withdrawal of Soviet 
personnel. The Soviet ‘arm’s length’ approach to technology transfer which was limited 
to the transmission of technical data (Heymann, 1975), meant Chinese engineers, ‘had no 
background design and development experience on which to draw’ [Hooker, (1984), 
p.213]. 
Unable to purchase Russian aircraft, the Chinese looked to the capitalist West and in 
1963, despite a US embargo bought six British Viscount 843 airliners (Engel, 2007), 
followed in the early 1970s by 35 British Trident airliners and ten American Boeing 707 
airliners. The Chinese also negotiated licensed production of Rolls-Royce Spey engines 
to be produced in Xian (Johnson, 1992). Having acquired modern Western airliners the 
Chinese then embarked on a plan to develop an indigenous airliner of their own, the  
Y-10, a reverse-engineered Boeing 707. Spearheaded by Wang Hongwen, one of the 
‘Gang of Four’, it was designed and built by the Shanghai Aircraft Manufacturing 
Company (SAMC) and first flew in September 1980 (Cantle, 2008). However so poor 
was its performance that it was quietly abandoned five years later when only two aircraft 
had been built. 
By the time the Maoist era drew to a close, the Chinese had built up an aerospace 
industry, but with the exception of the link to Britain’s Rolls-Royce, it was still wedded 
to out-dated Soviet technology (Dougan, 2002; Todd and Simpson, 1985). 
4.2 The co-production era of the 1980s and 1990s 
In the post-Mao era of economic reform, China’s ambitions for developing commercial 
aerospace became clearer. One strand of development involved the production of small 
less sophisticated civil aircraft, such as the 50 seat Y-7 turboprop airliner developed from 
the Russian Antonov An-24 (Dougan, 2002; Lewis, 1997). This project, like similar ones, 
did not meet with commercial success (Goldstein, 2006). Alongside these attempts at 
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small scale indigenous production, China mounted a serious effort to catch-up in the 
commercial aerospace market, by leveraging technological capabilities through 
cooperation with Western aircraft manufacturers (Nolan and Zhang, 2002, 2003). In 
particular China sought to co-produce a new generation of modern commercial airliners, 
as the first step in a ‘three step plan’ [Dougan, (2002), p.106], designed to enable the 
country to progressively catch up in terms of technological capabilities. The steps in this 
process were: 
1 cooperate with a foreign partner to co-produce a medium-sized civil airliner within 
China 
2 with a foreign partner jointly design and manufacture a 100 seat regional jet in China 
3 by 2010 have amassed the relevant technologies to provide a capability to design and 
build a medium-sized 180 seat airliner independently. 
As a first step, co-production not only offered an opportunity for including significant 
local content, it also offered scope for learning Western production methods. 
The strategy was initiated with an agreement in April 1985, following six years of 
protracted negotiation, with McDonnell-Douglas of the US for the co-production of the 
MD-80 airliner. The agreement was for Shanghai Aviation Industrial Corporation (SAIC) 
to co-produce twenty-five (25) 170 seat MD-80 airliners intended for domestic use in 
China. 15–20% local content was planned (Steenhuis and De Bruijn, 2004) initially. The 
first aircraft flew in 1987 with the first delivery in the same year (Andersen, 2008). Over 
the next eight years a total of 35 MD-82 and MD-83 jet airliners were assembled by 
SAIC [Goldstein, (2006), p.261], though the local content never approached the 75% 
planned [Goldstein, (2008), p.60]. 
A more ambitious follow-on agreement, signed by Aviation Industries of China 
(AVIC) in 1992 and intended as the second step in the three stage plan, was for the joint 
development of a new and more advanced version of the MD-82, the MD-90 ‘Trunkliner’ 
to be followed in time by a 100 seat regional jet version, the MD-95. A total of 150 
Trunkliners were planned [Dougan, (2002), p.107]. Assembly was to be carried out by 
SAIC in Shanghai, with 75% of the fabrication undertaken in China, including 
construction of the wings and forward fuselage in Xian, the nose in Chengdu and the 
empennage and electrical work in Shenyang (Lewis, 1997). However the Asian economic 
crisis of the late 1990s (McGuire, 1999), combined with the resistance of China’s Civil 
Aviation Administration and Boeing’s takeover of McDonnell-Douglas in 1996, 
eventually brought cancellation of the Trunkliner programme, with only two aircraft 
completed (Goldstein, 2006). 
Attempts to put in place alternative arrangements to implement the second step of 
China’s catch-up plan, this time involving the joint design and manufacture of a regional 
jet in collaboration with a foreign partner, were however to prove both frustrating and 
protracted. In 1994 the Chinese signed a memorandum of understanding with South 
Korea to develop the Air Express AE-100 regional jet (Lewis, 1995b; Steenhuis et al., 
2007). But difficulties in reaching agreement about each country’s role in the project led 
to the eventual withdrawal of the Koreans from the project in 1996 before a Western 
partner had been found. 
Undaunted, the Chinese pressed on and eventually found a Western partner in Aero 
International (Regional) (AI(R)), a European consortium comprising France’s 
Aerospatiale, Italy’s Alenia, and British Aerospace. The inclusion of Aerospatiale and 
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British Aerospace was significant, since both were part of the Airbus consortium and 
early in 1997 Airbus itself duly joined the project along with Singapore Technologies. 
Thus was born a new incarnation of China’s proposed regional jet, this time designated 
the AE-31X. Unfortunately China’s insistence on responsibility for systems integration, a 
capability it as yet clearly lacked, combined with a re-appraisal of the regional jet market 
by Airbus, who in the end decided to go it alone developing the A318 a 100 seat version 
of its highly successful A320 airliner, eventually led to this project also foundering in 
1998. 
4.3 The ARJ 21 regional jet 
Thwarted in their numerous attempts to find a foreign partner with whom they could  
co-develop a regional jet on terms that would provide appropriate opportunities for 
technological upgrading and enhancement, the Chinese eventually abandoned the search 
for a Western partner. Instead in June 2002 the ARJ21 regional jet, known as the ‘Xiang 
Feng – the Flying Phoenix’ (Anderlini, 2008), was launched. This time a very different 
development model was used. Based on the new network SSI, a partnership with a 
Western airframe manufacturer was replaced with a network of specialist global suppliers 
who provided a wide range of aircraft systems. 
The ARJ21 is a 90 seat regional jet, being developed as part of China’s 11th  
Five Year Plan (Endres, 2007), by Comac a government controlled consortium. This 
comprises the leading state-owned aircraft manufacturing plants, including those in 
Shanghai, Xian, Chengdu and Shenyang, long associated with aircraft manufacturing in 
China. Although Shanghai Aviation Industry Corporation (SAIC) is undertaking final 
assembly at its plant in Shanghai, Table 1 shows that other members of the consortium 
are being used to develop and manufacture major parts of the airframe. 
Table 1 Comac ARJ21Airframe Development and Production Responsibilities 
 Company Sub-system responsibility 
1 Chengdu Aircraft Company (CAC) Nose 
2 Shanghai Aircraft Industry Company (SAIC) Horizontal stabiliser 
3 Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) Vertical stabiliser, engine pylons, electrical 
sub-assembly 
4 Xian Aircraft Company (XAC) Wing, centre fuselage 
Source: Balut et al. (2008, p.3) 
As well as being the second stage of the three step catch-up plan that the Chinese 
embarked upon back in the 1980s, the decision to develop a regional jet was underpinned 
by two factors. Firstly the Chinese government hoped that the use of regional jets would 
rapidly expand during the decade of the 2000s (Sobie, 2003) mirroring the rapid growth 
in the use of regional jets that occurred in the US in the 1990s (Smith, 2003). Secondly it 
hoped that a regional jet capable of operating in high and hot conditions from short 
runways, would help to open up domestic air links with the country’s remote and under-
developed western provinces (Cantle, 2008), thereby bringing these relatively backward 
regions into the 21st century (Sweeney, 2008), without the need to invest in expensive 
roads and railways (Perrett, 2008). 
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Unveiled at the Beijing Air Show in 2001 (Eriksson, 2010) the ARJ21 was formally 
approved by the Chinese government in June 2002 with a CNY 5 billion ($600m) 
investment (Sobie, 2003). From the start the ARJ21 was a derivative design (Smith and 
Rogers, 2004) based on the McDonnell-Douglas MD-80/90 (Butterworth-Hayes, 2010), 
to which it bears a striking resemblance (Vertesy and Szirmai, 2010). Utilising tooling 
and jigs provided by McDonnell-Douglas as part of the earlier collaborative programme 
(Francis, 2007), the ARJ21 has an identical fuselage cross-section, nose section and tail. 
The first phase of the ARJ21 programme was directed to the development of the baseline 
passenger version of the aircraft designed to carry 85-90 passengers and with a range of 
2000 nautical miles (Doyle, 2002). Given that it was targeted at the domestic market 
(Goldstein, 2006), relatively modest sales goals were set for the ARJ21, with total sales 
forecast as 500 over a 20 year period. 
Table 2 Comac ARJ21 ancillary systems 
Supplier Country System 
General Electric USA CF34-10A turbofans 
Rockwell Collins USA ProLine 21 avionics 
Honeywell USA Flight control system 
Eaton Corporation USA Cockpit systems 
Goodrich USA Brakes and tyres 
Parker Hannifin USA Hydraulic systems 
Hamilton Sundstrand USA Auxiliary power unit 
Leibherr Aerospace Germany Landing gear 
Sagem France Flight deck control system 
Meggitt UK Engine control system 
Smiths UK Thrust reversal actuator 
A key feature of the project was the use of a network of Western suppliers employed to 
provide the major sub-systems of the aircraft (i.e., engines, landing gear and avionics)  
on an ‘off-the-shelf’ basis (Yeo, 2011b). Several US-based multinationals (see Table 2) 
such as General Electric, Rockwell Collins, Honeywell and Hamilton Sundstrand were 
involved as systems suppliers. In addition the Ukrainian design bureau, Antonov, 
designed and tested the new supercritical wing and the Canadian firm Bombardier 
provided technical assistance (Vertesy and Smirzai, 2010). In total the network of 
suppliers was estimated to be responsible for some 60–70% of the value of the aircraft 
[Francis, (2006), p.65]. Utilising a ‘network’ development model in this way enabled 
Comac to tap into the global technological and investment capacities available in the 
West. This significantly reduced the technological demands on Comac, allowing it to 
concentrate on developing its systems integration capability, the most critical element in 
terms of the expertise required to develop a modern airliner. Potentially it also reduced 
both the development cost and the lead time to market. Supplier selection went smoothly 
and was completed by 2003. 
When the project was given the formal go-ahead in 2002 it was envisaged that the 
aircraft’s maiden flight would be in 2006 with entry into service a year later in 2007 
(Doyle, 2002). However, the project encountered significant delays at the design stage. 
Regulators required the fuselage exit doors to be moved further back in order to facilitate 
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easier and faster evacuation in the event of an emergency. Unfortunately re-positioning 
the doors created a further problem, as it meant that they were too close to the aircraft’s 
fuselage mounted engines. This necessitated stretching the fuselage by a metre to create 
more space between the doors and the engines. This also provided space for an extra row 
of seats (Francis, 2006). As a result of this and a number of other required design 
changes, the entry into service date slipped by two years to 2009. 
The first metal was cut in 2004 and parts manufacture started in February 2006. Roll 
out of the first completed airframe at Dachang Airport in Shanghai took place in 
December 2007. This was followed almost a year later by the aircraft’s maiden flight, 
which had by now been postponed several times (Williams, 2009), in late November 
2008 (Francis, 2008). As Table 3 shows sales had by then reached 200 aircraft, although 
the programme was already three years behind schedule (Rabinovitch, 2012). 
The flight test programme involved extensive testing using four aircraft to prepare it 
for airworthiness certification not only with the Chinese authorities, but the FAA in the 
US as well. However the test programme did not go smoothly. Airworthiness certification 
was repeatedly delayed by serious setbacks. In November 2010 a wing cracked in testing 
(Rabinovitch, 2012). This led the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) to 
limit the aircraft’s flight envelope for the test programme, pushing the entry into service 
date back to late 2011. Problems were encountered with the wiring and the integration of 
the avionics systems (Toh, 2012), which further delayed the programme. 
However in April 2011 a major project milestone was reached when the aircraft 
finally completed static testing successfully (Yeo, 2011a). By mid-2012, significant 
progress had been made although the development programme had suffered further 
slippage. The ARJ21 successfully completed multiple take-off and landing tests required 
for airworthiness certification (Rabinovitch, 2012). At this point, He Dongfeng, Comac’s 
president, announced that after ten years of development, the ARJ21 had at last entered 
the final phase required to complete airworthiness certification. However full regulatory 
approval was not now expected until 2013 with first deliveries of the aircraft to airlines 
expected early in 2014 (Toh, 2012), more than six years later than originally planned. 
5 Discussion: the ARJ21 programme in perspective 
A recent appraisal of the ARJ21 programme described it as having ‘stumbled at the 
starting blocks’ [Rabinovitch, (2012), p.2], a reference to the fact that a number of  
short-comings and problems had become evident during the course of its lengthy 
development programme. The first of these was the successive delays and 
postponements, which had occurred in the ARJ21 programme, resulting in the 
programme being some six years behind schedule. As the case study indicates, this 
reflected a combination of factors including, an over-ambitious initial schedule, design 
problems, test failures and certification problems, which taken together resulted in 
successive postponements in the programme. 
Secondly, a number of commentators had also highlighted weaknesses in the 
programme itself, in particular the fact that the ARJ21 was, ‘lacking the technical 
strengths expected of a new product’ [Perrett, (2008), p.24], or as Richard Aboulafia of 
the aerospace consultants Teal Group put it the aircraft was, ‘stunningly obsolete’ [Yeo, 
(2011b), p.34]. This was a reference to the fact that the ARJ21, was a derivative of the 
McDonnell-Douglas MD80/90 of the 1980s, made little or no use of lightweight 
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composite materials, and was not equipped with the latest fuel efficient engines As a 
result it was relatively old-fashioned and overweight and offered comparatively poor 
performance in terms of fuel economy, compared to the new generation of regional jets 
being developed, and either in service or about to enter service at about the same time as 
the ARJ21. As Cliff et al. (2011, p.116) note in relation to the ARJ21, “thus even before 
it reaches production whether or not it can compete with existing Embrear and 
Bombardier regional jets is questionable ….. in a market in which fuel efficiency is a key 
characteristic, it is not clear why airlines would choose to forgo brands with proven 
safety and reliability records to purchase an unproven and less efficient aircraft”. 
Table 3 Comac ARJ21 orders 2003–2008 
Airline Date Country Quantity 
Shanghai Airlines 2003 China 5 
Shandong Airlines 2003 China 10 
Shenzhen Financial Leasing 2003 China 20 
Shanghai Financial Leasing 2003 China 30 
Xiamen Airlines 2004 China 6 
Kunpeng Airlines 2007 China 100 
Lao Airlines 2007 Laos 2 
GECAS 2008 US 5 
Joy Air 2008 China 50 
Total   228 
Source: Flight International (various) 
A third short-coming was the relative modest sales that had been achieved. As Table 3 
shows by 2008 total orders for the 90 seat regional jet stood at a little over 200. Even then 
they were almost exclusively domestic orders from China’s smaller short haul operators, 
the only foreign order being from Lao Airlines. Not only had the ARJ21 failed to achieve 
any sales to Western airlines, none of China’s ‘big three’ national carriers, Air China, 
China Eastern Airlines and China Southern Airlines had committed to the aircraft. As 
with China’s previous attempts at developing small commuter aircraft, often based on 
Russian designs, the ARJ21 had little or no relevance outside China. 
Table 4 New 100 seat Regional Jets 
Manufacturer Aircraft Size Engines Country Planned EIS 
Comac ARJ21 75-96 GE CF34 China 2011 
Mitsubishi MRJ-70 70-96 PW1000G Japan 2014 
Embraer E-170/190 70-120 GE CF34 Brazil 2004 
Sukhoi Superjet 100 78-98 SaM146 Russia 2010 
Bombardier C series 110-149 PW1000G Canada 2015 
Finally, the ARJ21 appeared, in part as a result of the lengthy period taken to develop the 
aircraft, to have been overtaken by new competitor aircraft in the regional jet sector even 
before it entered service. As Table 4 shows these new competitors include the Japanese 
Mitsubishi MRJ70, the Russian Sukhoi Superjet 100, and the Canadian Bombardier C 
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series. These new aircraft are advanced designs that make extensive use of lightweight 
composite materials and are equipped with new more efficient engines such as the Pratt 
and Whitney PW1000G geared turbofan engine. With their advanced designs, these 
newcomers offer significantly better performance than the ARJ21 (Perrett, 2008), in the 
case of the Mitsubishi MRJ as much as a 20% lower fuel burn. This has enabled all three 
aircraft to rack up significant orders from genuine blue chip non-domestic customers, 
including, in the case of the Mitsubishi MRJ, an order from America’s Trans States 
Holdings for 100 aircraft (Kingsley-Jones, 2009). 
However despite these short-comings it would be a mistake to rush to write-off the 
ARJ21 programme. For a start it is the first commercial jet to be designed and built in 
Asia, something that several countries have attempted to do but in which as yet only the 
Chinese have succeeded. 
In relation to the specific criticisms of the programme that have been outlined, it 
should be noted that although a six-year delay is a serious setback, delays in the 
development of new aircraft are not unusual. Both Boeing and Airbus have suffered 
lengthy and very costly delays with their most recent new aircraft projects, namely the 
Boeing 787 Dreamliner and the Airbus A380 Superjumbo. Similarly the claim that the 
ARJ21 is out-dated, old fashioned and lacking in new technology could also be levelled 
at Embraer and Bombardier. Their first regional jets, like the ARJ21, were ‘derivative 
designs’ [Smith and Rogers, (2004), p.522] based on existing aircraft but equipped with 
new engines and other up-graded systems to make them suitable for the regional jet 
market. As newcomers to the regional jet market these derivative designs actually proved 
very effective in enabling them to break into a market occupied by established airliner 
manufacturers. 
Similarly the lack of overseas orders, while undoubtedly disappointing, reflects the 
fact that the ARJ21 was planned primarily as a regional jet for the domestic Chinese 
market. Indeed it was designed to meet the very specific requirements of this market, like 
being able to operate from airports in the more remote and mountainous western regions 
of China such as Tibet, where conditions are particularly demanding. 
However the ARJ21 was above all intended primarily as an interim design. 
According to Perrett (2007) the Chinese authorities have always taken a long term 
perspective in terms of catch-up in the commercial aerospace industry. Perrett (2007) 
notes how this typically involves a deliberate, step-by-step learning process reminiscent 
of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping who advocated, ‘cross the river by feeling the 
stones’. Thus each step is based on experience from the previous one which in turn yields 
more experience for the next step. Hence the three stage process to enter commercial 
aerospace first embarked upon back in the 1980s, in which the ARJ21 project is but one 
stepping stone that will ultimately lead to China becoming a serious player in the global 
commercial aerospace industry. 
With this in mind it is important to note that the next stepping stone is already in 
place in the form of the Comac C919 180 seat, narrow body airliner launched in 2008. 
Due to make its first flight in 2014 (Yeo, 2010), this aircraft is the final stage of the three 
stage process initiated by the Chinese authorities in the 1980s. The Comac C919 will not 
only merely compete head-on with the Boeing and Airbus airliners, it is a modern design 
equipped with state-of-the-art CFM International Leap 1-C turbofan engines currently 
under development by the General Electric-Snecma joint venture, and even though still at 
an early stage of development, it has already attracted the attention of the world’s 
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airlines, with the Irish low cost carrier, Ryanair and British Airways having signed an 
agreement with Comac (Milmo, 2011). 
Hence the short-comings of the ARJ21 programme have to be set in the context of its 
primary role as a learning vehicle designed, as part of the three step plan initiated in the 
1980s, to facilitate the development of a modern narrow body airliner in the form of the 
Comac C919 that will compete directly with Boeing and Airbus. To this end Bédier et al. 
(2008) note that whether or not the C919 proves an effective competitor for Boeing and 
Airbus, is likely to depend on the extent to which the ARJ21 programme has enabled the 
Chinese, not merely to design and develop a modern commercial airliner to full Western 
standards, but also to accumulate the necessary programme management skills to 
coordinate many subcontractors and system suppliers, and put in place appropriate 
aftermarket support capabilities and facilities. 
Against this background, the delays and postponements, the lack of international sales 
and the reliance on current technology, while disappointing and attracting the ire of some 
Western commentators, may not in the long term be that significant, since the main 
purpose of the ARJ21 is to enable the Chinese to learn and accumulate the necessary 
capabilities to compete with Boeing and Airbus. 
6 Conclusions 
This study set out to answer two questions: 
1 What have been the main changes in the SSI for commercial aerospace? 
2 What are the implications of these changes for latecomer nations? 
The evidence presented here shows that the SSI has not merely changed in the last  
20 years, it has been transformed through a process of co-evolution. While the airframe 
manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus still dominate the sector in terms of overall sales of 
commercial airliners, co-evolution of the three elements of the SSI, actors, knowledge 
base and institutions, has resulted in a very different process of new product development 
emerging. 
This is very clearly in evidence with the ARJ21 programme. Unlike previous 
commercial aerospace projects in China, the ARJ21 relies on a network of strategic 
suppliers who have worked with Comac to provide the major sub-systems for the aircraft. 
These suppliers are from the West, chiefly the USA, and they are all major multinational 
corporations in their own right. As the case study shows many of these sub-systems (e.g., 
engines, landing gear and avionics) are provided on an ‘off-the-shelf’ basis rather than 
being developed specifically for this application. The significance of this network of 
suppliers is evident in the foreign content of the ARJ21, which has been estimated to be 
some 60–70% of its total value. Utilising this network approach to new product 
development has enabled Comac to become the first Asian aerospace manufacturer to 
develop a commercial airliner, something that many others have tried to do in the past but 
failed. Hence one may conclude that in the aerospace industry the old model of new 
product development where vertically integrated firms are the key actors within the SSI 
carrying out all the principal development functions, has evolved into a network SSI, 
where new commercial airliners are developed in close collaboration with strategic 
suppliers who account for the development and manufacture of up to two thirds of a 
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modern airliner, and the Chinese have endeavoured to take advantage of this evolutionary 
change with the ARJ21 programme. 
What are the implications for latecomer nations keen to catch-up and become 
significant players within the global aerospace industry? On the face of it the case of the 
ARJ21 suggests that the move to a network SSI makes it significantly easier for 
latecomer nations to catch-up. No longer is it necessary for one country to undertake the 
development of the entire aircraft, instead it is possible to work with strategic suppliers 
who have the experience and expertise to provide many of the necessary systems and 
sub-systems, thereby reducing uncertainty and the scale of the development task. Not 
only that, the case of the ARJ21 also shows the value of a staged approach to catch-up, 
where there is scope for extensive learning at each step or stage in the catch-up process. 
Under these circumstances catch-up is easier because new entrants can focus on key tasks 
like systems integration and the provision of appropriate product support. 
However, it would be a mistake to jump to this conclusion on the evidence of the 
ARJ21 programme. The emergence of a new SSI may indeed make the task of catch-up, 
while still a long and difficult process, a significantly less daunting one for latecomer 
nations. But, China is in many respects a special case. What is special is what McGuire 
(2011, p.2) describes as, ‘the immense promise of its internal air-travel market’. China is 
the second largest national air travel market in the world behind the USA (Cliff et al., 
2011). In 2007 China’s airlines booked more than 230 billion revenue passenger 
kilometres (RPK). Although this was only 20% of the traffic carried by US airlines it was 
still more traffic than that carried by other leading developed nations like Japan and 
Germany (Cliff et al., 2011). Not only that, China by virtue of its land area, population 
and growth prospects, represents huge latent demand (Hanlon, 2007). According to 
Boeing (2012) over the next 20 years GDP is likely to grow annually at 6.5%, with air 
traffic growing at 7% as a new middle class emerges. As Table 5 shows to accommodate 
this the country’s airline fleet will need to treble in size between 2012 and 2031, with 
some 5,260 new aircraft valued at $670billion required. In time China may well become 
the world’s largest aircraft market. 
Table 5 Chinese Commercial Airliner Market 2012–2031 
Aircraft 2011 fleet 2031 fleet New aircraft % 
Large 80 140 110 2.0% 
Twin aisle 280 1,310 1,190 23.0% 
Single aisle 1,490 4,220 3,650 69.0% 
Regional 60 310 310 6.0% 
Total 1,910 5,980 5,260 100.0% 
Source: Boeing (2012) 
A domestic market on this scale is something that no other latecomer nation can 
approach. Hence while the ARJ21 programme may demonstrate the potential of the new 
network SSI that is now found in the aerospace industry to enable latecomer nations to 
catch-up, it seems likely that the phenomenon of catch-up will be limited in its 
applications. It may well enable latecomer nations like Brazil and Japan to establish a 
presence as players in the commercial aerospace industry, but this is likely to be as niche 
players, supplying smaller aircraft like regional jets or as suppliers of specialist systems, 
only China by virtue of its huge domestic market seems likely to offer a serious challenge 
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to the current duopoly of Boeing and Airbus. And on the evidence of the time taken to 
develop the ARJ21 that point is still a decade off. However, when it does arrive, the role 
of the ARJ21 as a ‘stepping stone’ that enabled the Chinese to link up with Western 
suppliers, leverage technical knowledge, and learn the commercial aerospace business 
may then finally become apparent. 
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